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ABSTRACT
The main aim of my paper is to analyze whether experts have a distinctive testi-
monial status in society, or whether an expert's testimony requires considerable
epistemic deference (expertism). I will try to argue that no matter how reliable a
speaker is, this cannot in itself make it rationally acceptable for a hearer to accept
their report without assessment of their trustworthiness. However, I admit that
standing policy about an expert's trustworthiness, and the social climate concerning
experts, which includes sophisticated social constraints in terms of the possibility
that experts have deceived us systematically, makes a scenario of deceit and incom-
petence seem far less probable. Consequently, I will conclude that evidential stan-
dards in favour of expert's testimony are less demanded and that they are attainable
for ordinary hearers.
Key words: trust, testimony, experts, evidentialism, fundamental and derivative
authority
LA FIDUCIA NEGLI ESPERTI: FIDUCIA, TESTIMONIANZA E PROVE
SINTESI
Lo scopo principale del presente contributo è di valutare se gli esperti godano
nella società di un riconosciuto status di testimoni, o se per le loro testimonianze as-
suma particolare importanza il rispetto verso la loro competenza epistemica (esper-
tismo). Si cercherà di dimostrare che, indipendentemente dall'attendibilità del par-
lante, accettarne le parole, senza valutare se ci si trovi di fronte a un interlocutore
degno di fiducia, non è una condotta di per sé razionalmente accettabile da parte
dell'ascoltatore. Va tuttavia riconosciuto che – a causa sia degli elevati standard di
professionalità richiesta ai parlanti sia del clima sociale, che comprende sofisticate
forme di limitazione per quanto attiene alla possibilità di essere sistematicamente
ingannati dagli esperti – è molto meno probabile essere vittime di raggiri o incom-
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petenza. Ne consegue che tende a venire meno la richiesta di standard probatori, ac-
cessibili agli ascoltatori comuni, a sostegno della credibilità della testimonianza de-
gli esperti.
Parole chiave: fiducia, testimonianza, esperti, evidenzialismo, competenza di base e
derivata
Should we blindly trust experts? Or, more precisely, can we trust experts more
than we can trust other people? Should we base our trust in experts on evidence or do
we have an epistemic right to trust them without positive evidence due to their moral
and epistemic status? Should we treat the testimony of experts differently than the
testimonies we receive from other people?
In this paper, I am going to argue that we do not have the epistemic right to trust
experts without positive evidence because their testimony is not distinctive in nature
from other people testimonies. However, the degree of evidential support we need to
trust experts can be less rigorous because the scenario of non-competence is less
probable when compared with other conversational contexts.
EVIDENTIALISM CONCERNING TRUST
We can broadly determine the nature of testimony as "tellings generally" or as
saying something in an apparent attempt to convey information to someone else via a
verbal assertion or by some other means such as through a note (Fricker, 1995; Audi,
1997; Pritchard, 2004).
Trust here is understood primarily as the doxastic attitude or the acceptance of
other people's testimony, which has to be an object of epistemological evaluation and
not a matter of giving credulity without evidence. To trust another person simply
means to treat her as a source of knowledge (Faulkner, 2002). It is true that in many
situations our trust is a kind of emotional or affective attitude, or a spontaneous reac-
tive judgment, in which evidence plays a small role. Many authors stress this per-
spective on trust, insisting that trust is the matter of a pessimistic or optimistic atti-
tude towards the person and not a matter of deliberation about evidence. I have no
difficulties in admitting that in many everyday circumstances, we accept other peo-
ple's testimonies spontaneously without conscious assessment or that we accept these
testimonies even if we have good evidence against them. However, testimonial belief
based on such a form of trust has a different epistemic status in comparison to testi-
mony that is accepted on the basis of evidence (Jones, 1996; Adler, 2002). The epis-
temic strength of testimonial belief ought to be proportional to the strength of the
evidence.
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Namely, I assume evidentialism here, a viewpoint that takes justified trust (and
justified testimonial belief) as a matter of evidence. Evidence is treated here as a just
most familiar kind of epistemic reasoning, the link between an informant's testimony
that is presented as true and the conditions of truth of this very testimony.1 In short, I
define evidentinalism concerning trust in the following way: (ET) "Trust T towards
proposition p is epistemically justified for S at t if and only if having T towards p fits
the evidence S has at t" (Feldman, Conee, 2004).
Naturally, any apologist of the evidentialist position needs to be able to offer an
account of exactly what a person's evidence consists of and how strong it has to be in
order to make trust justified (Prijic Samarzija, 2007). However, for the purposes of
this discussion about the value of evidence for justified trust (or justified testimonial
belief), we only need to focus our attention on two opposed positions. On the one
hand, evidentialism is a position according to which justified trust requires ("always,
everywhere and for anyone") the appropriate evidential basis (Clifford, 1879, 183).
On the other hand, anti-evidentialists claim that justified trust need not be based on
evidence in the majority of those situations in which a person is reliable and where
there is no reason for doubt.2
However, it could be seen that there are some situations in which the evidential-
ist's requirement for evidence need not and, moreover, cannot be applied. It seems
that giving trust to experts, epistemic and moral authorities requires special treat-
ment. Even if we do not have an epistemic right to trust other people without evi-
dence, it seems pretty reasonable to allow the blind trust of experts. On many occa-
sions, giving credulity to experts is treated as desirable epistemic behaviour or even
as an epistemically virtuous behaviour. In short, if trusting experts is really an epis-
temically exceptional kind of trusting, it could be a problem for evidentialism. Let us
firstly consider the reasons for giving credulity to experts in a more detailed manner
that aims to set out the evidentialist's stance about this problem.
EXPERTISM
Let us define expertism as being a position that is composed of three statements:
(i) experts exist; (ii) we should ascribe a distinctive testimonial status to experts due
                                                          
1 Concerning trust, an evidentialist does not deny that non-evidential, affective, emotional etc. consid-
erations can affect or even cause our trusting, but their influence does not make acceptance epistemi-
cally responsible (see in Adler, 2002).
2 Evidentialism and anti-evidentialism correspond with traditionally opposed standpoints of reduction-
ism (D. Hume, E. Fricker, J. Adler, P. Faulkner, etc.) and anti-reductionims (T. Reid, C.A.J., Coady,
T. Burge, A.I. Goldman, etc.). While Humean reductionism requires that justified testimonial belief
has to be reduced on the basis of perceptual evidence or evidence delivered by reason or memory, Re-
dian anti-reductions have suggested that justified testimonial belief can be based on a kind of blind
trust without any evidence.
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their exceptional expertise; (iii) therefore, we have the epistemic right to trust experts
without evidence. Expertism is a genuine anti-evidentialist position with regards to
trusting experts.
1. Experts exist. While it is rather plausible that there are experts in science because
they deal with facts, the existence of moral or aesthetic experts, who deal with values,
is generally much more problematic. For instance, Milton Friedman holds that differ-
ences in values are differences caused by people's tastes which are more or less hard-
wired, undebatable and unchangeable (Friedman, 1984). Logical positivists believe
that value judgments are "nonsense" and cannot be a matter of expertise because they
are not verifiable. Many people think that most people have reasonable ethical com-
petence and that philosophers (who are the prime candidates for moral experts) are in-
clined to the same self-serving rationalizations as other people. However, the
untouchable status of experts in science can be disputed. From Kant, Kuhn, Quine to
Goodman and Putnam, we are aware of an intelligible objection that theoretical
hypotheses involve a theory laden, cognitively biased, socially manipulated and
subjective interpretation of the world (Goldman, 1999). Also, in science as well as in
ethics and aesthetics there are battles between experts who propose opposite theories.
In spite of the fact that claiming the first thesis is not without its difficulties, I will
assume that it is correct: there are people who are objective (not only reputational) ex-
perts. These objective experts are people who, in comparison with other people, are
more effective in problem solving. When compared with other people, they are better
guides to the truth or better in recognizing a false statement as false, and a true one as
true. While the views of ordinary people are typically an ill sorted mass of material de-
rived from experience and tradition which contains inconsistencies and tensions,
skilled experts can detect inconsistencies, fallacious inferences, unwarranted generali-
zations and false premises. In contrast to the average person in ordinary epistemic cir-
cumstances, they possess knowledge about the appropriate methods of research and
argumentation, more systematized information derived from long term experience of
dealing with difficulties, distinctions, critics, and alternative conceptions. They are
generally better trained to deal with epistemic, moral or aesthetic issues. Or, we can
say like Aristotle that it is reasonable to suppose that none of them can miss the target
totally, and that each has gotten something or even a lot of things right.
2. Distinctive testimonial status. In expertism, it is claimed that an expert's testi-
mony requires considerable epistemic deference. I can see at least three reasons why
would one ascribe a distinctive testimonial status to experts: (i) standing practice about
an expert's reliability; (ii) insufficiency of evidence; (iii) epistemic dependence.
Firstly, it could be seen that we have an epistemic right to treat an expert's knowl-
edge and sincerity with the utmost credulity because there is a standing practice, so-
cial climate or ongoing policy that considers experts to be the most reliable sources
of knowledge or that they are fundamental testimonial authorities in society (Pappas,
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2000). By assuming such credentials about experts, it could be seen that a hearer may
believe what an expert says without assessment, evaluation or additional evidence.
Secondly, many philosophers hold that our evidence in favour of other people's
testimonies is principally insufficient (Beanblossom, Lehrer, 1970; Coady, 1981;
Webb, 1993; Foley, 1994). If it is true, our evidence in favour of an expert's testi-
mony is even more insufficient: when a layperson relies on an expert, that reliance is
necessary blind (Hardwig, 1991).3 We, as non-experts in a domain, cannot ever pos-
sess enough evidence to evaluate an experts' testimony as credible or non credible.
An ordinary cognizer in ordinary epistemic circumstances does not possess, or even
can never attain, a high enough level of expertise to evaluate the testimonies of ex-
perts. We simply do not have enough knowledge and experience in order to be capa-
ble of assessing the truth of an expert's testimony or an expert's reliability. Since our
reasons for the acceptance of the content of an expert's report – by definition of them
being experts and us as non-experts – cannot be the reasons the experts possess, our
evidence about an experts' report cannot be ever sufficient for the justified accep-
tance of her testimony. If we are not experts in a domain, the relevant defeaters (un-
defeated defeaters) or certain kinds of experiences, doubts and beliefs that can un-
dermine justified trust simply are not present to us. So, it could be seen that we have
no choice other than to blindly trust experts.
Thirdly, we are deeply aware of our epistemic dependence on the testimonies of
experts. Without other people testimonies "we should have to confess to knowing
pitifully little" (Dummet, 1993, 420). But without expert testimonies our knowledge
about biology, physics, medicine, geography of the world, history would be devas-
tated. The majority of our beliefs about nature and society that we acquired through-
out our lives are based, finally, on what experts 'tell' us (see also in Beanblossom,
Lehrer, 1970; Faulkner, 2002). Our judgments of value will be a mass of inconsistent
intuitions, prejudices and stereotypes derived from our subjective and partial inter-
ests, understandings of tradition, our temper etc. Behind the majority of testimonies
lies extensive research and reports by experts and without these basic experts' testi-
monies "our lives would be impoverished in startling and debilitating ways" (Lackey,
2006, 1). So, it could be said that such an epistemic dependence on experts entails
blind trust as a precondition of the functioning of our reason.
3. Blind trust. In the light of these reasons, it seems that expertism could be an
appropriate theory about the testimony of experts, even if we hold that anti--
                                                          
3 Naturally, it is possible for a hearer to have some background beliefs on a topic in light of which the
expert's testimony sounds plausible. However, most often, an ordinary hearer cannot have a sufficient
evidential basis about report content p in order to recognize and ascribe knowledge to experts. Evi-
dence requirement places too great a burden on the average person, since it requires of them to have the
capacity to evaluate the experts. Besides, many people with expertise are people about whom we know
little; "Hence, there may be little or no basis for us to grant them derivative authority?" (Foley, 1994,
57–58).
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evidentialism is inadequate for ordinary communication or information transactions
between non-experts. Experts possess a fundamental epistemic authority and our de-
pendence on their knowledge gives us an epistemic right to trust them without evi-
dence. According to Reid, the paradigm of trusting is like a child's trust in adults. The
situation of trusting experts' testimonies is in many ways analogous to his under-
standing of the trust of children. There is no available experience on which we can
base our resistance to trust. Even between those philosophers who are inclined to
evidentialism, there are authors who hold that the trust of children is exceptional and
that they are justified to give trust without evidence (Fricker, 1987, 1994, 1995). So,
it seems that expertism is the most persuasive anti-evidentialist stance and,
consequently, the most serious challenge for evidentialism.
FUNDAMENTAL AUTHORITY AND THE INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
At the beginning, I would like to show that even if we admit epistemic compe-
tence and accept that there are people whose expertise is comparatively better than
that of the majority others, there are good reasons to believe that we cannot have the
epistemic right to trust them without any evidence.
According to expertism, experts have a fundamental authority in contrast to the
derivative authority of other informants. While fundamental authority does not imply
the requirement of evidence, derivative authority requires the hearer to give their rea-
sons for thinking that the source's information, abilities, or circumstances put him in
an especially good position to make an accurate claim (Foley, 1994). This means that
an expert's beliefs and their testimonies may be treated as a basic belief because it
cannot, and should not be, supported by the beliefs/epistemic reasons of novices. On
the other hand, novice beliefs are beliefs in superstructure that have to be based, in-
ferred or justified by relying on the expert's testimonies. Such an approach to experts'
beliefs corresponds to Goldman's determination of expertism as being social founda-
tionalism (equivalent of foundationalism in individual epistemology) or a position
that it is socially most desirable (justified) to accept experts' beliefs as the most basic
in veritistic sense (Goldman, 1987).
I have no difficulty in admitting that there is a certain standing practice within the
community according to which experts are considered to be more reliable sources
than any other social source. Also, I agree that trusting a particular expert on a par-
ticular occasion is just an episode of trust that relies on the standing policy in a com-
munity. However, there is nothing that gives a hearer the epistemic right to trust
without assessing whether her source has an adequate social role of expert in the do-
main in which the trust occurs. A hearer has no epistemic right to believe without any
"justifiers" – evidence about the facts or states of affairs that determine the distin-
guished testimonial status of experts. For instance, the recognition of an alleged ex-
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pert's fundamental authority requires that at least some items from the list of "justifi-
ers" have to be accessible to a hearer: that there is a particular standing practice in a
community to trust experts, that there are some epistemic reasons why this is stand-
ing practice in a community, that this very expert has special expertise in this very
domain, that in these very circumstances an expert has no some (epistemic or other)
interest to deceive us, etc. (Jones, 1996; Govier, 1998). An expert's distinctiveness
cannot be described in terms of fundamental authority, but only as a derivative
authority of the highest degree. This means that there is also an evidence requirement
for an expert's testimony, but the epistemic standards for the evidence we need are
less-demanding because the scenario of non-competence is less probable.
From the standpoint of expertism, it could now be objected that such an evidence
requirement, on which I insist, in principle cannot be satisfied in the case of an ex-
pert's testimony: the trust novices give to experts is necessarily blind because they
can never possess enough expertise for the assessment of expert's testimonies. The
insufficiency of evidence is a reason to give, not only derivative, but genuinely dis-
tinctive fundamental authority to experts.
I would like to stress here that all situations of testimony are characterized by the
fact that an informant knows what the listener does not know. It would not be a case
of acquiring knowledge by testimony if a hearer knows p about which the testifier
has told her, or even if she can deduce or infer p from her available evidence. A
hearer, novice or not, simply does not possess and, by definition of testimony, cannot
possess the evidence for the truth of report content p as her informant does. So, an
expert's testimony is not so different from any other testimony: the testimony of a
passer-by in a foreign town, the testimony of an informant at the information desk or
the testimony we can read in a newspaper. All these ordinary informants who "tell"
us something new, or unknown, play the role of expert in relation to us because we
do not know the information they convey to us. So, there is no reason to think that an
insufficiency of evidence about an expert's testimony can justify blind trust more
than in any other case of testimony. Contrary to expertism, I claim that when the
content of testimony is at stake, there is no principal reason to differ between the tes-
timonies of experts and other people.4 An insufficiency of evidence is not a good
reason to ascribe a distinctive fundamental authority to experts.
We can resume this part with the conclusion that we are epistemically dependant
on experts, but also on other people testimonies. In the case of an experts' testimony
                                                          
4 It could be said that an insufficiency of evidence is not a reason to think that our epistemic right to
trust without evidence is better grounded in the case of experts, but that it entails blind trust in all
cases including the trust of experts. Such a new diagnosis requires further debate about the strength of
this argument about the insufficiency of evidence that is beyond our present purposes. I would only
like to show that there is no reason to claim that we have to ascribe a distinctive testimonial status to
experts.
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(as well as in any other case of testimony) a hearer has to be sensitive to the issue of
who would count as a good informant (and sensitive to the relevant defeaters). An
expert's distinctiveness is not at stake but cannot be described in terms of
fundamental authority, but only in terms of the degree of derivative authority: the
evidence we need in the case of experts is less-demanding because the error
possibility is less salient than in other cases of testimony.
RELIABILITY OF EXPERTS AND EVIDENCE
There is another way in which it can be argued in favour of expertism. With re-
gards to justified trust, when there is a standing practice to trust experts in a commu-
nity it is not required for a hearer to possess some "justifiers" or that she is aware of
evidence why she believes that an expert is reliable. It is only needed for the practice
to be reliable. A hearer, in gaining a justified testimonial belief, has to be engaged in
a reliable belief forming process i.e. her testimonial belief has to be formed by proc-
esses that tend to produce accurate representations of the world. Evidence (under-
standing, reasons why we trust) confers no benefit on hearer as cognizer. A lack of
evidence about the distinctiveness or reliability of experts will not preclude a hearer
from gaining justified testimonial belief (testimonial knowledge).5 Moreover, pos-
sessing an appropriate level of deference will be sufficient in order to know the truths
we believe on the basis of scientist's testimony. We do not also have to know why
that deference is appropriate (Roush, 2005).
Let us stress that this externalist or reliabilist reading of expertism suggests a sort
of causal theory of testimony. Three conditions have to be satisfied: (i) (there is
standing practice that) experts are the most reliable speakers – the most competent
believers and the most sincere testifiers; (ii) they cause belief in the hearer; (iii) there
is no-defeater on the hearer's side. These conditions are sufficient for the acquisition
of justified testimonial belief. It has to be stressed that any causal relationship will
not be sufficient to yield justified belief from testimony, but it will in those cases in
which a speaker is an expert because an expert, by definition of being an expert,
would not believe and testify that p if p were false6 and/or he would not believe and
testify p without it being so it is p.7
Moreover, according to such an expertist account, we can attain cognitive success
even if we do not possess (adequate) evidence: a hearer can perfectly exercise justi-
fied trust no matter how little, false or partial or inappropriate evidence she has.
Namely, it is possible to accept true belief on the basis of false or in other way
inappropriate (partial, circular, insufficient) evidence. Some authors even stress that
                                                          
5 Such an approach can be interpreted as a kind of reliabilism or externalism in theory of justification.
6 Nozick's sensitivity condition (Nozick, 1981).
7 Sosa's safety condition (Sosa, 1999; 2002).
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such an evidence or fittingness requirement can result with "investigational sloth" –
an evidence requirement does not guarantee justified or true belief (Goldman, 2002).
Our testimonial belief is not true, or justified because of evidence, but because of re-
liable processes: it is enough for the informants to be experts and for there to be no
defeater on the side of the hearer. Thus, it can be concluded that evidentialism is false
because; (i) evidence is irrelevant for acquiring justified belief and (ii) if evidence is
irrelevant then we have an epistemic right to trust experts without evidence.
***
Externalist (reliablistic) strategy in the defense of expertism imposes the task on
evidentialism to argue about the relevance and the value of evidence. Expertism cor-
rectly captures the contribution that needs to be done by experts in a testimonial ex-
change, but neglects the positive contribution that a hearer needs to make. While in
evidentialism, there is no obstacle to embrace both conditions (the hearers condition or
evidence requirement and the speaker conditions or reliability requirement8), exper-
tism ignores or even eliminates the hearers condition. I would like to argue that for
many reasons such a strategy is inferior to the evidentialist approach (Lackey, 2006).
1. Opacity objection. In a situation in which a hearer has no evidence in favor of
experts' trustworthiness and no idea why his testimony can be true, a hearer actually
has no idea whether the belief is worthy of acceptance. The merits of the belief will be
opaque to the hearer (Lehrer, 2006). Some form of subjective or personal evidence re-
sulting from our background system of evaluation of acceptance, preference over ac-
ceptance and reasoning about acceptance is not irrelevant but necessary for justified
belief.
2. Rationality of trusting. No matter how reliable an expert is, this cannot by itself
make trusting justified in terms of rationality. It would be not only unjustified, psy-
chologically unexplainable but irrational for any hearer to accept an expert's testi-
mony without any evidence about her expertise. Even though irrational beliefs can be
correct/true, the only way in which it makes sense to aim at having a correct/true be-
lief is by means of having a rational belief (Wedgewood, 2002). Only if a hearer's
trust in the informant is rational, do they need to make a rough estimate of the truth
of the claim (Hardin, 2002).
                                                          
8 Lackey actually proposes a kind of dualist stance: "For every speaker A and hearer B, B justifiedly
believes that p on the basis of A's testimony that p only if: 1) B believes that p on the basis of the
content of A's testimony that p; 2) A's testimony that p is reliable or otherwise truth conductive, and 3)
B has appropriate positive reasons for accepting A's testimony that p" (Lackey, 2006, 170). According
to Lackey, "The justificatory work of testimonial beliefs can be shouldered exclusively neither by the
hearer nor by speaker. [...] [T]he speaker condition ensures reliability while the hearer condition
ensures rationality for testimonial justification" (Lackey, 2006, 170).
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3. Reliability based on evidence. Hearer and speaker conditions are (logically) in-
dependent: it is possible that our trust is based on evidence and the testimonial trans-
mission is not reliable (speaker condition non-satisfied). It is also possible that trust is
not based on evidence and the transmission is successful (hearer condition non-satis-
fied). However, the real question is why successful testimonial transmission is so often
found with the possession of good evidence. Why have we so often satisfied a reliable
process condition when we have also evidence in favour of this very testimony?
While expertism implies that it is possible that a hearer is massively deceived by his
evidence, I would like to claim that this is not possible in the long run in the majority of
situations. Evidential defectiveness is transparent and thus recognizable. Our back-
ground beliefs also include evidence about our experience in trusting or, to be more
precise, about the reliability and successfulness of our evidence. Moreover, I would be
keen to claim a certain tracking view of evidence: generally speaking, if a testimonial
process is not reliable, H would not have evidence in favour of testimony that p and
also, if testimonial process is reliable, H would have evidence in favour of testimony of
p. If one trusts for the wrong reasons or with false (inappropriate evidence), there is a
strong tendency to ferret this out. Evidentially based trust and reliable testimonial proc-
esses coincide too often to say that evidence is irrelevant or that evidence does not have
any relevance for attaining justified belief (or testimonial knowledge).9
4. Truth accessibility. The strength of expertism is built on a skeptical objection
about the relation between evidence and truth: while evidence that someone can pos-
sess does not guarantee the truth of the belief, the appropriate reliable (causal) proc-
ess does. However, since we lack direct access to the reliability of testimonial proc-
ess or truth, we have no choice but to approach truth by way of rationality and the
possession of adequate evidence. What makes us cognitive beings at all is our capac-
ity for belief, and the goal of our distinctively endeavors are truth: we want our be-
liefs to correctly and accurately depict the world. If truth were somehow immediately
accessible, then the concept of evidentially based trust would be of little significance.
But this epistemically ideal situation is quite obviously not the one in which we find
ourselves, and it is for this reason that evidence comes into picture (BonJour, 1985).
5. Conflict between experts. If evidence is irrelevant and we have an epistemic
right to trust experts without evidence, the question is how to decide which testimony
we should accept when two experts are making conflicting claims about the same
subject-matter. According to expertism, where there is a standing practice to trust ex-
perts in a community, we should trust experts without evidence. It implies that we
should accept both testimonies and this means that we have the epistemic right to be-
lieve in incompatible beliefs. It is not only phenomenologically non-realistic but it is
an extremely dubious stance that has consequences. In contrast, since evidentialism
                                                          
9 Tracking view of evidence is inspired by Steup's proposal of internal reliabilism. See in Steup, 2007;
Roush, 2005.
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suggests that trust is a matter of evidence about a rival experts' reliability, we should
accept the testimony that is better supported by the hearer's evidence (or suspend
trust in absence of decisive evidence). In the worst case, acquired testimonial belief
could be false (until it is be replaced by evidence on better grounded belief).
CONCLUSION
It seems to me that these briefly accounted arguments clearly suggest the strength
of evidentialism over expertism both in its foundational and reliablistic form. We do
not have an epistemic right to accept any testimony without evidence no matter how
reliable an informant is, i.e. regardless on their distinctive testimonial status. A
hearer's evidence about an expert's reliability or unreliability bolsters or defeats the
hearer's justification both in accepting testimony from that source and in believing
this very testimonial belief.10
However, it might be completely incorrect to conclude from this that we suggest
that there is no difference between experts and ordinary people in terms of their
trustworthiness. As I pointed out earlier, experts deserve distinctive testimonial status
(but still in terms of derivative authority) because of their comparatively better ex-
pertise and exceptional regularity in their trustworthiness or certain epistemic con-
sistency that allows us to ascribe them a relatively stable inner disposition to be
trustworthy. A testimonial situation in which we assess an expert, evidential standard
that makes trust justified need not to be as demanding as in other conversational
contexts. It is worth stressing that evidential standards are not the same for all testi-
monial situations and what makes testimonial situations different are levels of error
possibilities. Evidential standards raised and lowered by the relevance of the scenar-
ios of deceit. Since experts are comparatively the most reliable informants, the alter-
native scenario of deceit is less probable and the evidential standard requires a slen-
der evidential basis. Similarly, when our informants are not experts, the alternative
scenario of deceit becomes relevant, evidential standards have to be stricter and this
means that we need additional positive evidence against the scenario of deceit.11
                                                          
10 It has to be stressed here that even A.I. Goldman, one of the most prominent representatives of reli-
abilism in theory of justification, admits a certain role of evidence in trusting experts. He wrote: "The
usual route to true belief, of course, is to obtain some kind of evidence that points to the true proposi-
tion and away from rivals. […] The rationale for getting such evidence is to get true belief" (Goldman,
2002, 62). It is true that the value of evidence Goldman has in mind is mainly instrumental, but his
point is undoubtedly in accordance with evidentialism: he holds that our evidence about the properties
of the speaker is crucial evidence for your overall entitlement to accept the speakers' assertion (Gold-
man, 2001).
11 In support to such a conclusion, it is possible to redefine our definition of evidentialism concerning
trust in following way: Trust T towards proposition p is epistemically justified for S at t if having T
towards p fits the evidence that eliminates contextually relevant error-possibility concerning p at t.
About this position of trust contextualism, s     	
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POVZETEK
V tradicionalnem smislu je bilo temeljno vprašanje etike verovanja: kaj naj ver-
        ! "   a-
siti: komu naj zaupamo? Glede na to se epistemologi delijo v dve skupini: tiste, ki
trdijo, da bi morali zaupati skoraj vsakomur, in tiste, ki trdijo, da bi morali biti zelo
previdni. Povedano z drugimi besedami: medtem ko prvi menijo, da je zaupanje
##$ %#  " # !  & !   "  & "
primernih dokazov.
'&! #  &    #&!  # ! #  " d-
met epistemološkega vrednotenja, ne pa stvar lahkovernosti brez dokazov (eviden-
()* + &   #  (!  & & " #a-
zov, lahko štejemo izkazovanje zaupanja moralnim in epistemskim avtoritetam
, #)      #   ,&#(
# %  )* -    #  !   kov-
# #$    # &  &"     %   
potrebno precejšnje epistemsko spoštovanje (ekspertizem).
#&$ " #!     ! ##     (!
zaradi tega še ni samo po sebi racionalno sprejemljivo, da poslušalec sprejme nje-
gove besede brez ocene, ali je vreden zaupanja. Vendar pa priznam, da je zaradi vi-
#%      #    &" #!  #
 & .( &"  ! #   !  "  k-
 #   !  #   !  " "      e-
kompetentnosti.

   #&#!    #% %! #    
 & # # !  $&        &$(*
/& "0 &!  ! # #!  (!   z-
peljana pristojnost
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